In Re Estate of Bovaird: The Ultimate Burden of Federal Estate Taxes in Oklahoma by Coiner, R. H., Jr.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 4 
Summer 1983 
In Re Estate of Bovaird: The Ultimate Burden of Federal Estate 
Taxes in Oklahoma 
R. H. Coiner Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
R. H. Coiner Jr., In Re Estate of Bovaird: The Ultimate Burden of Federal Estate Taxes in Oklahoma, 18 
Tulsa L. J. 656 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss4/5 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENTS
IN RE ESTATE OF BO VAIRD: THE ULTIMATE
BURDEN OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES IN
OKLAHOMA
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) governs which property must
be included in a decedent's gross estate' for federal estate tax pur-
poses,2 but does not designate which property is to bear the actual bur-
den of paying the tax,3 allowing state law to control the issue.4
Although in Oklahoma it is possible to allocate ultimate liability for the
federal tax in the will itself,5 many testators fail to do so.6 Conflicts
1. In this Note, "gross estate" means property which is included in the estate for purposes of
the federal estate tax. I.R.C. § 2031 (1976). "Estate" means anything a person owns when he or
she dies. The "taxable estate" is the gross estate less all applicable deductions. I.R.C. § 2051
(Supp. V 1981). "Probate estate" means property which is subject to the decedent's will or to the
intestate succession law of Oklahoma. "Non-probate property" is property which has a benefici-
ary designation or is held in joint tenancy. Thus, when the owner dies, nonprobate property
passes directly to the beneficiary or joint tenant. The executor or administrator (referred to as the
personal representative) and the probate court have no power over nonprobate property. For
example, a house owned solely by X will pass according to his will or, if there is no will, according
to the intestate succession law. The proceeds of an insurance policy, which go directly to the
beneficiary named in the life insurance contract, are nonprobate property. "Residue" or "residual
property" is that portion of the probate estate left after specific devises and bequests. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (5th ed. 1979).
2. The estate tax provisions of the I.R.C. are §§ 2001-2209 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The
gross estate is defined at § 2031. A simple explanation of the estate tax system is that when a
person dies, everything he or she owns is valued. These values are totaled, certain deductions are
allowed, and the remainder is taxed at a percentage ranging from 18% to 65%. Id § 2001 (Supp.
V 1981). Until 1982 the maximum rate was 70%; the top rate is now scheduled to drop to 50% in
1985. Id § 2001 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 171 (codified at scattered sections of the I.R.C.), all property passing to a
surviving spouse is deducted from the gross estate to arrive at the taxable estate. I.R.C. § 2056
(Supp. V 1981). Charitable gifts at death are also tax free. Id § 2055 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. I.R.C. § 2002 (1976) provides only that "[t]he tax imposed by this chapter shall be paid by
the executor."
4. See Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 98 (1942) (The Supreme Court, finding that state
law governs apportionment of taxes, held that a New York statute apportioning the burden did
not violate federal law.); Susman & Fourticq, ,4pportionment of Death Taxes: .4 Comprehensive
Survey with Proposed Statute, 45 TEx. L. REV. 1348, 1361-63 (1967);see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 22-29 (discussing history of apportionment of estate taxes).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 3; id. tit. 58, § 461 (1981). Title 84, § 3 provides in part:
1
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arise when the testator either fails to allocate the burden or does so
ineffectively. 7
Oklahoma courts have traditionally placed the burden of the tax
on the residue of the probate estate.' This has been unfair in two ways:
first, property which passes outside the will, such as assets held in joint
tenancy or in inter vivos trust, is part of the taxable estate but has es-
caped contribution to payment of the tax; second, certain nontaxable
residuary bequests and devises, which do pass under the will, have
been forced to contribute to payment. Although residuary bequests to
spouses or charities do not create any tax liability,9 they may bear a
significant portion of the federal estate tax.10
A recent Oklahoma case, In re Estate of Bovaird, which reverses
this judicial rule as it applies to a spouse's forced share of the estate,
may have a substantially broader impact on the apportionment of fed-
eral estate taxes in Oklahoma. This Note examines the background
and reasoning of Bovaird and attempts to predict how the Oklahoma
The property of a testator, except as otherwise especially provided in this code and
in the chapter on civil procedure must be resorted to for the payment of debts in the
following order."
1. The property which is expressly appropriated by the will for the payment of the
debts.
2. Property not disposed of by the will.
3. Property which is devised or bequeathed to a residuary legatee.
4. Property which is not specifically devised or bequeathed, and,
5. All other property ratably.
Id (footnote omitted). Title 58, § 461 provides:
If the testator makes provisions by his will or designates the estate to be appropriated for
the payment of his debts, the expenses of administration, or family expenses, they must
be paid according to such provisions or designation, out of the estate thus appropriated,
so far as the same is sufficient.
Id Although estate taxes are not "debts" in Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held
that estate taxes are an administration expense and thus subject to these provisions. Tapp v.
Mitchell, 352 P.2d 900, 905 (Okla. 1960); In re Estate of Rettenmeyer, 345 P.2d 872, 880 (Okla.
1959).
6. See, eg., Thompson v. Wiseman, 233 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1956). In Thompson, the will
did not designate a source for payment of estate taxes and the widow resisted contribution, precip-
itating the suit. Id at 736.
7. E.g., id For sample language appropriating particular portions of the estate, see 2 EsT.
PLANNING & TAx'N COORDINATOR (RIA) % 18,461-18,464 (1981).
8. E.g., In re Estate of Fullerton, 375 P.2d 933, 947 (Okla. 1962); In re Estate of Ret-
tenmeyer, 345 P.2d 872, 880 (Okla. 1959).
9. The marital deduction is provided for at I.R.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The
charitable deduction is found at id § 2055.
10. Note, Estate and Gift Taxv Federal Estate Tax-Burden of a Marital Share, 33 OKLA. L.
Rav. 384 (1980). The Note uses two hypotheticals to illustrate the impact of the "burden on the
residue" rule on a spouse's share. If part of the residue passes to a spouse, that share must contrib-
ute the proportion of tax which it bears to the entire residue. Thus, the spouse's net share can be
considerably reduced. Id at 392-93.
11. 645 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1982).
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Supreme Court might answer several problems raised for practitioners
under the new rule.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Davis D. Bovaird died in 1979, leaving most of his estate to his
three children. 2 Florence H. Bovaird, his widow,' 3 elected to take
against the will and then sought a declaratory judgment that her forced
share14 did not have to contribute to payment of the federal estate tax. 15
The will provided for payment of estate taxes out of the probate estate
and specifically exempted nonprobate property from liability.' 6 Mrs.
Bovaird argued that her forced share did not come out of the residue
and therefore should bear none of the burden of federal estate taxes. 17
The trial court agreed, holding that the will directed that the estate
taxes should be paid from the property passing under the will, and that
the widow's forced share did not pass under the will but by operation
of state law.'" Appealing to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the chil-
dren argued that the widow's share was residue and that no statute or
case exempted the widow from payment of federal estate taxes.' 9 The
supreme court stated the issue: "May a surviving spouse who elects to
take against the will of her husband, be required to contribute to the
federal estate tax?" 0 It would have been possible for the court to free
the widow's share from contribution by simply affirming the reasoning
of the trial court, but the court went a step further, adopting principles
of equitable apportionment of federal estate taxes.2'
12. Id at 501. Mr. Bovaird's probate estate was valued at over three and one-half million
dollars. Mrs. Bovaird was bequeathed the homestead and certain personal property. Inventory
and Last Will and Testament of Davis D. Bovaird, Deceased (in file oflIn re Estate of Bovaird,
No. P-79-978 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1979)).
13. Mrs. Bovaird, a well-known Tulsa philanthropist, died in 1982. Mrs. B vaird Dies; Riles
Set, Tulsa World, Oct. 15, 1982, at F3, col. 3.
14. 645 P.2d at 501. A testator cannot leave less to a spouse than the spouse would have
received under the intestate succession law. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 44, 213 (1981). If he does, the
spouse may elect against the will and receive the intestate share. The share so taken is called the
"forced share." Little v. Cunningham, 381 P.2d 144, 147 (Okla. 1963); Turner v. First Nat'l Bank,
262 P.2d 897, 900 (Okla. 1953); Thomsen v. Thomsen, 196 Okla. 539, 543, 166 P.2d 417, 420
(1946).
15. 645 P.2d at 501.
16. Id at 502.
17. Id
18. Id
19. Id;see Appellants' Brief at 11, In re Estate of Bovaird, 645 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1982).
20. 645 P.2d at 501.
21. Id at 504-05.
[Vol. 18:656
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III. OKLAHOMA LAW PRIOR TO BovAiRD
The I.R.C. provides that the federal estate tax shall be paid by the
executor22 without specifying how the burden is to be distributed
among the beneficiaries of the estate or whether the executor has the
right to demand contribution towards the tax liability from nonprobate
beneficiaries. There are, however, three exceptions: the executor may
demand contribution from nonprobate beneficiaries for tax liability
created by life insurance proceeds;2 3 by the exercise, nonexercise, or
release of a power of appointment;24 or by certain property qualifying
for the marital deduction under the new terminable interest rules.25
Because the I.R.C. requires the executor to pay the tax, some early
courts held that federal law required that the tax be paid out of the
probate estate.26 In Riggs v. Del Drago,27 the United States Supreme
22. "The tax . . . shall be paid by the executor." I.R.C. §2002 (1976). Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2002-1 (West 1981) provides, "This duty applies to the entire tax, regardless of the fact that
the gross estate consists in part of property which does not come within the possession of the
executor or administrator." If no executor or administrator is appointed, the I.R.C. provides that
anyone in "actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent" is considered an
executor. I.R.C. § 2203 (1976).
23. I.R.C. § 2206 (1976) provides in part:
Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross estate on
which tax has been paid consists of proceeds of policies of insurance on the life of the
decedent receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor, the executor shall be enti-
tled to recover from such beneficiary such portion of the total tax paid as the proceeds of
such policies bear to the taxable estate.
24. I.R.C. § 2207 (1976) reads in part:
Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross estate on
which the tax has been paid consists of the value of property included in the gross estate
under section 2041 [powers of appointment], the executor shall be entitled to recover
from the person receiving such property by reason of the exercise, non-exercise or release
of a power of appointment such portion of the total tax paid as the value of such prop-
erty bears to the taxable estate.
25. I.R.C. § 2207A (Supp. V 1981). "Qualifying terminable interest property" is commonly
known as QTIP. As a general rule, life estates and other estates terminating after a certain length
of time or on a particular event do not qualify for the estate and gift tax marital deduction. Id
§ 2056(b)(1) (1976). Executors of estates of decedents dying after 1981, however, may elect to
have certain property interests qualify for the marital deduction. The property is subsequently
taxed when the surviving spouse (the donee) dies or disposes of the property. Id §§ 2044,
2056(b)(7) (Supp. V 1981). Section 2207A allows the estate of the surviving spouse to recover
from the recipient of the property the amount of federal estate tax caused by inclusion of the
property in the estate of the surviving spouse. For example, if A and B are married and A dies, his
executor may elect to include any QTIP in the marital deduction. If he so elects, the property is
not taxed in A's estate. When B dies, the property is taxed in her estate. B's estate has the right,
under § 2207A, to recover the estate tax allocable to the QTIP from B's devisee. See 3 EST.
PLANNING & TAX'N COORDINATOR (RIA) $1 44,830-44,836 (1982), 48,241-48,249 (1983); 2 FED.
EST. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) 7530 (1977), 7533 (1983), 8371 (1982), 8374.10 (1982).
26. Eg., In re Del Drago's Estate, 287 N.Y. 61, 38 N.E.2d 131 (1941). The New York Court
of Appeals held that "Congress. . .placed the burden of the tax upon the residuary estate rather
than upon legacies." Id at 69, 38 N.E.2d at 135. The court also held that federal law governed
the issue. "Since Congress had the power to. . .determine where the burden should rest, those
4
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Court established the current federal rule that allows state law to gov-
ern the allocation of the burden of federal estate taxes. In Riggs, the
New York Court of Appeals struck down a New York statute appor-
tioning the tax, holding that the field was preempted by federal law.28
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "applicable state law...
should govern. . . the ultimate impact of the federal tax."29 The effect
of this rule is to allow each state to allocate the burden, either by statute
or judicial rulemaking. A substantial number of states have adopted
complete equitable apportionment statutes, requiring each asset to bear
the share of estate tax which it generates.30 Other states have adopted
either equitable apportionment 3' or the "burden on the residue" rule3 2
by court decision.
"Equitable apportionment" does not have a commonly agreed
upon meaning. For example, it may mean that nontaxable shares of
acts are the supreme law of the land and the State legislative acts in question, if in conflict with the
Federal law, are a nullity. ... Id at 77, 38 N.E,2d at 139 (citation omitted). Prior to Riggs v.
Del Drago, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that federal law required that the burden of
federal estate taxes be placed on the residue of the probate estate. "[T]he law makes no provision
for apportionment of the tax among legatees, but leaves it simply to be paid out of the estate
before distribution is made." Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, -, 124 N.E. 265,
267 (1919). I.R.C. § 2205 (1976) provides some support for this position, allowing beneficiaries
holding property who are forced by I.R.S. action to pay estate tax to recover such amounts from
the undistributed estate. See also PlunkettApportionment ofthe Federal Estate Tax in the Absence
of Statute or an Expression ofIntention, 51 MICH. L. REv. 53, 54-58 (1952) (summary of the early
cases). The debate over which law controls was ended when the United States Supreme Court
reversed In re Del Drago's Estate. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
27. 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
28. Id at 97. See supra note 26 for a discussion of the New York Court of Appeals'
reasoning.
29. 317 U.S. at 98.
30. Such statutes, often modeled after the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, 8 U.L.A.
159 (1972), free spouses and charities from contribution, since property passing to these parties
generates no estate tax. Among the states adopting the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act
are Hawaii, HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 236A-1 to -9 (1976); Maryland, MD. EST. & TRusTs CODE
ANN. § 11-109 (1974); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-20-16 (1976); Oregon, OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 116.303 to .383 (1981); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-23.1-1 to -12 (1956); and
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 7301-7309 (1981). An earlier version of the Uniform Act was
adopted by Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.610 (1973); Michigan, MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN.
§§ 720.11 to .21 (West 1968); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-16-601 to -612 (1979); New
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 88-A:l to :12 (1970); and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-10-
101 to -110 (1977). Apportionment provisions are also contained in the Uniform Probate Code, 8
U.L.A. 478 (1972), adopted as of 1981 by 15 states. 8 U.L.A. 114 (Supp. 1982) (list of states
adopting apportionment provisions). For a list of other apportionment and non-apportionment
statutes, see 2 FED. EST. & GIFT TAx REP. (CCH) % 8340.16 (1977).
31. Eg., Bragdon v. Worthley, 155 Me. 284, 153 A.2d 627 (1956) (inter vivos transferees are
liable for contribution when transfers are included in gross estate for federal estate tax purposes).
32. Eg., In re Atwell, 85 Cal. App. 2d 454, 193 P.2d 519 (1948) (federal estate tax is an
expense of administration, chargeable against gross estate in same category as any other charge
executor or administrator must pay from probate estate).
5
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the probate estate need not contribute to the tax,33 but that the burden
remains on other property in the probate estate. Another interpretation
is that only assets in the taxable estate must contribute, whether pro-
bate or nonprobate.3 4  Requiring only assets in the taxable estate to
contribute would exempt bequests to spouses and charities, since those
testamentary transfers are nontaxable. 5
Oklahoma law was apparently first interpreted by the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Thompson v. Wiseman .36 The Tenth Circuit
first found that estate taxes were an "expense of administration" and
then applied title 84, section 3 of the Oklahoma Statutes.3 7 Thus, the
burden of the estate tax fell on the residue, causing the wife's share of
the residue to bear its proportionate share of tax, despite the fact that
the share qualified for the marital deduction and was not part of the
taxable estate.3 8 Thompson was extensively quoted with approval in In
re Estate of.Rettenmeyer,39 the first Oklahoma Supreme Court case to
consider the ultimate burden of federal estate taxes.40 In Rettenmeyer,
the court affirmed the trial court's holding that a spouse's bequest from
the residue should share the tax burden equally with other shares of the
residue.41  Thompson and Rettenmeyer are factually distinguishable
from Bovaird as both involved bequests in a will, not forced shares.42
The following year, in Tapp v. Mitchell,43 the Oklahoma Supreme
33. See Northern & Wachter, The Ultimate Burden ofthe Federal Estate Tax in Kansas-A
Dilemmafor Executors, 17 WASHBURN LJ. 231, 237-41 (1977).
34. The Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act requires contribution from nonprobate as-
sets. 8 U.L.A. 159 (1972). See supra note 30 for a list of states which have adopted the Uniform
Act.
35. The marital, charitable, and any other allowable deductions are subtracted from the gross
estate to reach the taxable estate. I.R.C. § 2051 (Supp. V 1981).
36. 233 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1956).
37. Id at 737. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 3 (1981), quoted in full atsupra note 5, designates which
property in the probate estate must bear the debts of the estate. The Tenth Circuit held that the
same order applied to administration expenses, including estate taxes. 233 F.2d at 737 n.3. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court later confirmed that estate taxes are an administration expense in Tapp
v. Mitchell, 352 P.2d 900, 905 (Okla. 1960).
38. 233 F.2d at 736.
39. 345 P.2d 872, 880 (Okla. 1959).
40. While Rettenmeyer was the first Oklahoma Supreme Court case on the burden of federal
estate taxes, the court had already ruled that the burden of the Oklahoma estate tax fell on the
residue, reasoning that since the lien of the tax was on the entire estate, "it is the executor or
administrator, rather than the beneficiaries of such devisees (sic) or legacies, that is primarily
liable for payment of the tax." Ward v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 322 P.2d 172, 177 (Okla. 1957).
The federal estate tax lien also falls on the entire estate; thus this reasoning would also apply to
the federal tax. However, Ward was not discussed in Rettenmeyer, 345 P.2d 872.
41. 345 P.2d at 880.
42. Id; 233 F.2d at 736.
43. 352 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1960).
6
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Court overruled an attempt to charge nonprobate property with its pro-
portionate share of estate tax and held that "the entire estate tax bur-
den, whether occasioned by property within or dehors probate, falls
upon the estate."" The court also stated that Rettenmeyer was an ex-
press rejection of the "equitable doctrine of estate tax apportion-
ment.""5 In a 1962 case, 6 the Oklahoma Supreme Court reaffirmed
Rettenmeyer, holding that, absent direction in the will, estate taxes
were to be paid out of the residue of the probate estate.47
In 1965, the Oklahoma Legislature passed the Uniform Estate Tax
Apportionment Act,48 which requires complete apportionment. The
Act apparently reversed the rule in Rettenmeyer, but it was repealed in
196949 without having been interpreted by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. With repeal of the Act, presumably the previous judicially es-
tablished rule of Rettenmeyer and Tapp again became the law of
Oklahoma. This presumption was confirmed in a 1977 decision,50 in
which the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, relying on Tapp, held that all
"debts, estate taxes and costs of administration" must be allocated in
accordance with title 84, section 3 of the Oklahoma Statutes."1
Thus, Oklahoma courts consistently rejected equitable apportion-
ment of federal estate taxes until the 1982 case, In re Davidson Trust, 2
in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied equitable principles of
apportionment, holding that a charity need not contribute to payment
of federal or state estate taxes.53  The court did not mention Ret-
44. Id at 905. It is unclear from the opinion whether Tapp v. Mitchell involved federal as
well as state estate taxes; the court did use Reltenmeyer, 345 P.2d 872, as precedent. 352 P.2d at
905.
45. 352 P.2d at 905.
46. In re Fullerton's Estate, 375 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1962).
47. Id at 947. As with Tapp v. Mitchell, 352 P.2d 900, it is unclear whether federal estate
taxes were involved. It was not important to distinguish federal and Oklahoma estate taxes in
these cases until 1973, when the Oklahoma Legislature added provisions to the Oklahoma estate
tax laws which were used by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re Davidson Trust, 641 P.2d
1110 (Okla. 1982), to apportion both the federal and Oklahoma estate taxes. Id at 1113; 1973
Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 206, § 7 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 825 (1981)). All of the cases
discussed thus far were decided before the statutory change. The court's discussion of the new law
in Davidson is at 641 P.2d at 1113; see infra text accompanying notes 52-58.
48. 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 271, §§ 1-12 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 2001-2011
(Supp. 1965)).
49. 1969 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 97, § 1.
50. In re Estate of Murray, 579 P.2d 203 (Okla. App. 1977).
51. Id. at 205.
52. 641 P.2d 1110 (Okla. 1982).
53. Id at 1114. Although the asset in question was a nonprobate asset, specifically a power
of appointment, the executrix sought to force the charities to pay under I.R.C. § 2207 (1976). See
supra note 24 for the text of the section.
[Vol. 18:656
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tenmeyer and refused to accept Thompson v. Wiseman as precedent,54
relying on title 68, section 825 of the Oklahoma Statutes as authority
for apportioning both federal and Oklahoma estate taxes, stating,
"[W]e need not respond to appellant's contention that estate taxes shall
be paid out of the residue of the estate, that law having been supple-
mented by § 825." 55
The portion of section 825 quoted as authority by the Davidson
court reads:
Unless the will otherwise provides, the tax shall be appor-
tioned among lineal and collateral persons.
The tax on interests passing to collateral persons shall be
apportioned in the proportion that the value of interest re-
ceived by each collateral person bears to the total of the inter-
ests passing to all collateral persons.
The tax on interests passing to lineal persons shall be ap-
portioned in the proportion that the value of interest received
by each lineal person bears to the total of all interests passing
to lineal persons.5 6
Relying on this section as authority for apportioning federal estate
taxes presents several problems. First, the purpose of section 825 is to
set forth the rates for the Oklahoma estate tax. The words "the tax" in
section 825 clearly refer to the Oklahoma estate tax; there is neither a
reference to the federal estate tax nor to taxes in the plural. Second, the
section only apportions among lineal and collateral heirs-a distinction
which does not exist in the federal estate tax laws.57 Third, the lan-
guage apportions according to the value of the interest passing, not ac-
cording to the share of the taxable estate. Charities and spouses are not
exempt from contribution under such a provision, since assets passing
to them have value. Conceptual difficulties like these, and the court's
reference to equitable principles as grounds for apportionment,58
meant that Davidson left Oklahoma law somewhat uncertain. Bovaird,
decided little more than a month later, also left many questions
unanswered.
54. 641 P.2d at 1113-14. This was apparently a case of first impression in Oklahoma. Id at
1114.
55. Id at 1113.
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 825 (1981).
57. All beneficiaries except the spouse receive the same treatment under the federal tax.
I.R.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Oklahoma estate tax provides for lower tax rates on
bequests to lineal heirs. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 825 (1981).
58. 641 P.2d at 1114.
1983]
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IV. THEORIES OF THE CASE
In Bovaird, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the
trial court's holding that the widow's forced share was not residue and
therefore was not liable for estate taxes. 9 The court also adopted the
principles of equitable apportionment.60 Since either of these holdings
would have freed Mrs. Bovaird from contribution to federal estate
taxes, the court's adoption of both makes the future application of this
decision unclear.
The court reasoned that the forced share was non-residue because
it passes by operation of law and therefore comes out of the probate
estate before the residue.61 The consequence of this holding, standing
alone, is that a surviving spouse who receives a bequest from the resi-
due would contribute to the federal estate tax, while a spouse electing
against the will would not contribute. Although the court was not ex-
plicit about its reasons for adopting equitable apportionment, this re-
sult, which is clearly inequitable, may explain the decision.
The court based its acceptance of equitable apportionment, and
the concurrent relief for a surviving spouse, on two ideas: simple fair-
ness and congressional intent in passing the marital deduction. 62 The
court reasoned that since a marital share, which qualifies for the mari-
tal deduction,63 does not create tax liability, it should not bear any bur-
den of payment of the tax. The court assumed that Congress' intent
was to free the marital share from tax liability, as well as to exclude it
from the taxable estate.64
These two theories, the forced share as non-residue and the adop-
tion of equitable apportionment, have created uncertainty for practi-
59. 645 P.2d at 503.
60. Id at 505.
61. Id at 502-03.
62. Id at 504.
63. I.R.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The marital deduction was formerly limited to
$250,000 or one-half the gross estate, whichever was greater. It is now unlimited as a result of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 171 (codified at scattered
sections of the I.R.C. (Supp. V 1981)).
64. 645 P.2d at 504. The court cited a line of cases at 67 A.L.R.3d 199, 217-22 (1981). At
least one court takes the opposite view--that the purpose of the marital deduction is to benefit the
entire estate by lessening the overall tax burden. Inre Mosby's Estate, 554 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Mont.
1976) (spouse taking elective share must contribute to estate taxes because marital deduction is for
benefit of entire estate). Undoubtedly the main goal of Congress was to equalize treatment of
couples living in common-law and community property jurisdictions. Several states, including
Oklahoma, had passed community property laws to take advantage of favorable estate tax treat-
ment, but most of the statutes, including Oklahoma's, were repealed after the marital deduction
was passed. Note, supra note 10, at 385-86.
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tioners, who must determine what interests are subject to the Bovaird
rationale. The typical estate has no adversary to monitor the executor
or the attorney, upon whom the executor normally relies in technical
matters, such as apportioning federal estate taxes. Thus, the attorney,
as well as the executor, walks an ethical tightrope when dealing with
uncertain legal issues such as this. The executor is personally liable on
his fiduciary bond for mistakes.65 Other parties also have a substantial
stake in reaching the correct result. The beneficiaries of the estate, who
are often unsophisticated parties, face large gains or losses depending
on who must bear the burden of federal estate taxes. Since probate
judges must approve accounts before estates can be distributed and
must approve the net size of each distributive share, they indirectly su-
pervise the payment of federal estate taxes.66 The remainder of this
Note attempts to predict how Oklahoma courts might handle the issues
which have been presented as they arise in the practice of estate attor-
neys in the future and suggests the fairest, most convenient, and most
correct result.
V. THE FORCED SHARE AS NON-RESIDUE
A number of possible results might be inferred from the first hold-
ing in Bovaird, that the forced share of a surviving spouse is not resi-
due. First, the circular estate tax computation, which increases the
total tax due and reduces the marital share, is avoided.67 If the spouse
65. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 173 (1981) (bond conditioned on faithful execution of trust); id
§ 288 (personal representative liable for failure to return inventory); id § 491 (personal represen-
tative liable for misconduct in sale of estate property); id § 597 (personal representative liable for
failure to pay creditors claims when ordered by court).
66. Id § 632 (court must name persons and proportions or parts to which each is entitled); id
§ 634 (court must be satisfied all Oklahoma estate taxes are paid before allowing distribution).
Since federal estate taxes affect the share of each beneficiary, allocation of the ultimate burden of
federal taxes is of concern to the probate judge. No Oklahoma statute specifically requires that
the judge supervise payment of federal estate taxes. But cf. Tapp v. Mitchell, 352 P.2d 900, 905
(Okla. 1960) (federal estate taxes classed as debts or administration expenses in Oklahoma); Van
Hoozer v. Myers, 98 Okla. 243, 247-48, 224 P. 977, 982 (1924) (all taxes, including federal income
taxes, are debts of estate and must be paid before distribution of probate estate); Oklahoma Title
Examination Standards, OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. §§ 17.1-.3 (1981) (duration and priority of
federal estate tax lien).
67. When a spouse's share pays part of the tax, the share of the spouse becomes smaller.
Since the marital share is smaller, the marital deduction is smaller and the amount of tax paid
becomes larger. The spouse must then pay part of the increase in the tax, further decreasing her
share, and so on. The Internal Revenue Service accepts two mathematical solutions to this di-
lemma, both of which involve complex operations and require a great deal of expensive legal and
accounting expertise. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 904 (1980). However, these
solutions do not alter the result-more tax is due.
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does not contribute to payment of the federal estate tax, the computa-
tion is not necessary and less tax is due.
A second significant result is that the forced share will be free of
contribution to the debts of the estate and expenses of administration.
Oklahoma statutes provide that the residue of the estate is to be used to
pay debts and expenses before resorting to specific bequests and de-
vises,"' and the forced share should now join specific bequests and de-
vises as the properties of last resort for payment of these expenses.69
While this result follows logically from the rule in Tapp v. Mitchell7"
that taxes are an administration expense, it is not particularly equitable
since it has the effect of increasing the electing spouse's net share in
relation to the intestate share.71
A third possibility is that any other property in the probate estate,
which passes by operation of law rather than under the will, may be
considered non-residue and free from contribution to estate taxes. Two
examples are the share taken by a child omitted from a wil 72 and prop-
erty subject to homestead rights.73 If the property is free of estate taxes,
it might also be free of contribution to debts and other administration
expenses. The share taken by an omitted child serves the same purpose
as the forced share of a surviving spouse; it carries out the social policy
that property should be left to the immediate family.74 The child's
share is currently fully taxable,75 and therefore there is no reason to
favor an omitted child over other heirs in paying the taxes. But under
the Bovaird rationale, if the share is not residue, it should be exempt.
68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 3 (1981) (order in which property to be used to pay estate taxes).
Seesupra note 5 for text of this section. Tapp v. Mitchell, 352 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1960), is the leading
case holding that taxes are an administrative expense. See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 591 (1981)
(order of payment of debts); id § 594 (time for payment of certain expenses).
69. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 3 (1981) (order of resort to property for debts of estate). See supra
note 5 for the text of the section.
70. 352 P.2d 900, 905 (Okla. 1960).
71. On the other hand, since the spouse is usually in an adverse position to the personal
representative when she is electing against the will, and often must hire her own attorney, it may
seem fair that she should not have to help pay the personal representative's fee and the fee of the
attorney for the estate.
72. Children born after a will is signed or who are unintentionally omitted from it may claim
their intestate share of the probate estate. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 131-132 (1981). The intestate
succession law is codified at id § 213.
73. Id tit. 31, §§ 1-5 (1981).
74. See, e.g., id tit. 84, § 44 (spouse cannot be disinherited); id §§ 131-132 (child must be
explicitly disinherited).
75. The federal Orphan's Deduction, I.R.C. § 2057 (1976), which was only available when no
parent survived, was repealed in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, effective as to estates of
decedents dying after Dec. 31, 1981. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 427, 95 Stat. 171, 318-19 (1981) (codified
at scattered sections of the I.R.C. (Supp. V 1981)).
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Homestead property is subject to certain rights of the surviving
spouse,76 but is currently subject to sale for taxes and receives no spe-
cial estate tax treatment.77 Nevertheless, the argument can be made
that the spouse's rights take homestead property out of the residue,
since the survivor has the right to occupy the homestead and the right
of occupancy is not subject to administration proceedings.78
While freeing a forced share from payment of debts and adminis-
tration expenses or freeing the share of an omitted child from contribu-
tion to estate taxes may not seem particularly fair, these results follow
logically from the first holding in Bovaird. Since the policy behind
Bovaird, exempting a nontaxable share from paying taxes, does not ap-
ply to omitted children and homestead property, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court will probably refuse to extend the non-residue ration-
ale to other shares of the estate.
VI. EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
The second holding in Bovaird adopts equitable apportionment of
federal estate taxes.79 As pointed out above,8" "equitable apportion-
ment" is not a doctrine with a precise meaning. The two most likely
meanings of the phrase as used by the court in Bovaird are relief from
contribution for the spouse, with the burden falling on the probate es-
tate, and complete apportionment among the holders of property in-
cluded in the taxable estate.8 ' To determine which of these or several
other possibilities82 will eventually be the rule, it is necessary to look at
the Oklahoma Supreme Court's use of policy and precedent. An exam-
ination of the arguments for and against these potential outcomes
should assist personal representatives and their attorneys in carrying
out their duties properly.
A. Relief/or a spouse taking a forced share; burden still on the
probate estate.
The narrowest possible interpretation of the court's opinion im-
76. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1 (1981).
77. Id §5.
78. Id tit. 58, §§ 311-318;see generally R. HuFF, OKLAHOMA PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 301-307 (1982) (general discussion of homestead laws).
79. 645 P.2d at 505.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
81. See Susman & Fourticq, supra note 4, at 1366-81 (general discussion of some of the
possible meanings of equitable apportionment).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
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plies that a bequest out of the residue to a spouse would not be free of
contribution to federal estate taxes, while a widow's forced share would
be free of contribution. The effect of this interpretation is to give a
spouse whose husband has attempted to cut her out of the will a larger
share than that of a spouse whose husband either makes a proper be-
quest of at least one-third of the residue or dies intestate.8 3 Since in
each of these situations the marital share qualifies for the marital de-
duction and creates no tax liability, there is no equitable reason to
favor a forced share over a bequest or an intestate share. However, the
reasoning in Bovaird can be read to imply that this is what the
Oklahoma Supreme Court means by "equitable apportionment" in this
context. This conservative reading is plausible for several reasons.
First, the children in Bovaird, relying on Thompson v. Wiseman,84 ar-
gued that "it is illogical that a one-third bequest of residue to a spouse
(as in Thompson) would be treated any differently than a one-third
forced share of an estate ... *"85 But the court, noting that "they cite
no authority for that argument in logic,"'8 6 rejected their argument. In
fact, Thompson itself distinguishes between a forced share and a be-
quest. Thompson involved a bequest of residue8 7 and the Tenth Circuit
rejected arguments for apportionment based on cases dealing with
forced shares, saying that they presented "a problem different from
whether a residuary devise to the wife under the will should share the
debt and tax burden."8'
A second factor supporting this result is that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule Thompson in Bovaird.
Rather, the court said, "[W]e prefer to come down on the side of the
widow and hold that her forced share shall be treated preferentially
83. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 44 (1981) provides in part, "No spouse shall bequeath or devise
away from the other so much of the estate of the testator that the other spouse would receive less
in value than would be obtained through succession by law." Oklahoma courts have enforced this
provision by allowing the surviving spouse to choose between the provisions in the will and the
intestate share. See supra note 14.
84. 233 F.2d 734, 738 (10th Cir. 1956).
85. 645 P.2d at 503 (emphasis in original).
86. Id
87. 233 F.2d at 737.
88. Id at 738. There is little difference between a forced share and a bequest with regard to
estate taxes. Neither a forced share nor a bequest creates tax liability for the estate. As a practical
matter, of course, in those cases in which estate taxes on nonprobate property greatly deplete the
probate estate, the share available to the surviving spouse could be destroyed. If this happens to a
bequest, it could be argued that the testator intended depletion of the fund. But the public policy
favoring a forced share suggests that the testator should not be allowed to do indirectly what he
cannot do directly-defeat the forced share.
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. . . ."89 Third, the court looked to Spurrier v. First National Bank,9  a
Kansas case which also involved a forced share, as a guide.9' In Spur-
rier, the Supreme Court of Kansas, while freeing a forced share from
contribution, confirmed its earlier holdings that "in the absence of any-
thing in the will to the contrary, the burden of federal estate taxes falls
on the residuary estate."92 The Kansas Supreme Court later extended
the holding to include a residuary bequest to a spouse.93
While such an outcome may seem arbitrary, it is the only outcome
directly supported by the facts and analysis in Bovaird.94 The con-
servative approach is to read "equitable apportionment" in Bovaird as
applying only to the forced share of a spouse.95
B. Relieffor allproperty interests passing to the spouse which qualiy'
for the marital deduction; burden still on the probate
estate.
If the court's purpose in Bovaird is to carry out the congressional
intent in creating the marital deduction, 96 it should not matter whether
the spouse takes by bequest, by intestacy, or by election against the
will. All qualify for the marital deduction; none cause any tax liability.
If the intent of Congress is to allow spouses to transfer property to one
another without tax consequences, all these transfers should be exempt
from contribution to federal estate taxes.
Simple fairness to all spouses also supports this second view. Un-
less the goal is to punish a testator for his violation of public policy in
leaving so little property to a spouse, there seems to be no reason to
treat a forced share more favorably. It is also doubtful that many testa-
tors understand that they are burdening their spouses with a portion of
89. 645 P.2d at 503.
90. 206 Kan. 406, 485 P.2d 209 (1971).
91. 645 P.2d at 503.
92. 206 Kan. at -, 485 P.2d at 212.
93. Jackson v. Jackson, 217 Kan. 448,-, 536 P.2d 1400, 1404-05 (1975); see also Northern &
Wachter, supra note 33 (discussion of difficulties posed for executors by a limited holding such as
Bovaird or Spurrier).
94. Although Bovaird only addressed the issue of a spouse's forced share, charities were pre-
viously exempted from contribution to the ultimate burden of federal estate taxes under In re
Davidson Trust, 641 P.2d 1110 (Okla. 1982).
95. The Bovaird court cited an Oklahoma Law Review Note suggesting it is illogical to distin-
guish statutory and testamentary shares, but pointing out that Montana makes this distinction.
Note, supra note 10, at 390 n.47, citing In re Mosby's Estate, 554 P.2d 1341 (Mont. 1976). See
supra text accompanying notes 84-88 for the Bovaird court's discussion of this distinction.
96. I.R.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 62-64 for the
Bovaird court's discussion of congressional intent.
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the federal estate tax when they make residuary bequests with out direc-
tions for apportioning the tax.97 Freeing all spouses from contribution
also avoids the circular estate tax computation and lowers the total
amount of tax due.98
Exemption of all property which qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion can be inferred from the Bovaird opinion. The court cites a 1980
Oklahoma Law Review Note which suggests that all property passing to
the spouse should be free from contribution to estate taxes as "the mod-
em trend of thought." 99 In addition, the court quoted from several
cases freeing forced shares from contribution'0° and from one case in-
volving a spouse's intestate share, t0' and stated, "We agree with the
'logic, justice and equity' of the above cases and hold that to the extent
a spouse's property qualifies as a marital deduction, she will not be
required to contribute to the federal estate tax."' 02 This language may
be read narrowly, however, since none of the cases discussed free a
bequest to a spouse from contribution to federal estate taxes.
C. Complete equitable apportionment based on the taxable estate.
Complete apportionment is specifically adopted in the Uniform
Estate Tax Apportionment Act,10 3 which requires all assets in the taxa-
ble estate, including nonprobate assets, to contribute to payment of es-
tate taxes. 1°" Many of the arguments for consistent treatment of all
marital shares also apply to complete apportionment among all assets
in the taxable estate, whether probate or nonprobate. Since the Note
cited by the court suggests that complete apportionment is the fairest
procedure,10 5 this is another possible result of the Bovaird decision.
Some commentators feel that the arguments against equitable ap-
portionment are generally weak."° One argument is that it is more
97. Susman & Fourticq, supra note 4, at 1364.
98. See supra note 67 for an explanation of the circular estate tax computation.
99. 645 P.2d at 505 (discussing Note, supra note 10).
100. The court relied on cases at 67 A.L.R.3d 199, 217-22 (1981), quoting Seymour Nat'l Bank
v. Heideman, 133 Ind. App. 104, 178 N.E.2d 771 (1961); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, 240
S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1951); Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W,2d 884 (Mo. 1961).
101. Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955).
102. 645 P.2d at 504.
103. 8 U.L.A. 159 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 48-49 for the history of this Act
in Oklahoma.
104. 8 U.L.A. at 160, § 2.
105. Note, supra note 10, at 390. It is possible to free the marital share and charities without
bringing in nonprobate assets. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
106. See Susman & Fourticq, supra note 4, at 1360-65. Before Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S.
95 (1942), other arguments were made, such as that "it is anomalous to impose on a beneficiary a
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convenient for the personal representative, who must file the return, 1°7
to pay the taxes out of the residue, since the only assets readily accessi-
ble to him are probate assets under his control. To compel nonprobate
beneficiaries to contribute a proportionate share of the taxes might re-
quire court action.
Since the will at issue in Bovaird expressly exempted nonprobate
property from contribution to taxes, the court did not reach the issue of
whether, absent direction in the will, nonprobate property must con-
tribute to federal estate taxes.108 However, the opinion does have lan-
guage supporting complete apportionment. The court stated, "We
apply principles of equitable apportionment, and overrule those por-
tions of Rettenmeyer that conflict herewith."'1 9 The court also men-
tioned that, in Davidson,l" ° "We approached the issue of equitable
apportionment. .. ""lI and cited a Missouri case 1 2 for the proposition
that "the burden of federal estate tax (falls) on the property which gen-
erates the tax, and exonerates therefrom property which does not."'"1 3
Since the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited this case, which applies the
Missouri rule of complete equitable apportionment, 14 perhaps Bovaird
may be interpreted to imply that complete equitable apportionment is
now the rule in Oklahoma.
D. Reliefforproperty eigible for credits against estate taxes.
The Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act' '5 indicates that an
even broader interpretation of equitable apportionment is possible.
tax computed with a rate graduated according to the amount left by the testator"; that the tax is an
administration expense; and that Congress intended non-apportionment. Note, Apportionment of
Federal Estate Taxes. Which Funds Bear the Burden, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 690, 699-700 (1940).
107. I.R.C. § 2002 (1976).
108. It is not clear whether a testator may, in his will, require property not passing under the
will to bear some portion of the estate tax. Since nonprobate assets do not pass under the will,
some courts have held the testator powerless, absent a statute allowing him to do so, to burden
nonprobate property with estate taxes. Susman & Fourticq, supra note 4, at 1366-75.
109. 645 P.2d at 505. In Rettenmeyer, the Oklahoma Supreme Court required a bequest to a
spouse to contribute to federal estate taxes. 345 P.2d 872, 880 (Okla. 1959). Overruling Ret-
tenmeyer suggests that Boraird is not limited to forced shares.
110. In re Davidson Trust, 641 P.2d 1110 (Okla. 1982) (charities exempt from contribution to
federal estate taxes).
111. 645 P.2d at 504.
112. In re Estate of Wahlin, 505 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
113. 645 P.2d at 504 (quoting Wahlin, 505 S.W.2d 106).
114. 505 S.W.2d at 112. In Wahlin, the Missouri Court of Appeals freed several charities,
whose bequests were exempt from taxation, from contribution to estate taxes and required appor-
tionment among nonprobate assets. Id at 103, 112.
115. 8 U.L.A. 159 (1972).
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The Act provides that "allowances shall be made for any . . . credits
allowed by the law imposing the tax."'"1 6 One example of such a credit
is the Credit for Prior Transfers allowed by the I.R.C." 7 The Uniform
Act also allows deductions to be apportioned." 8 Deductions attributa-
ble to a particular property may affect the amount of contribution for
that property.
Making allowance for both deductions and credits could become
quite complicated since deductions are subtracted before reaching the
taxable estate, while credits are allowed against the actual tax liabil-
ity." 9 Since the Bovaird court did not discuss any factual situations
other than a forced share, a personal representative should wait until
the Oklahoma Supreme Court further clarifies its holding before apply-
ing equitable apportionment to this extent.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in Bovaird to free a widow's forced share from con-
tribution to federal estate taxes is a significant reversal of Oklahoma
law and leaves many questions unanswered. The scope of the decision
is unclear and will create great uncertainty among fiduciaries, many of
whom are personally liable for failure to carry out their duties cor-
rectly. Whether all marital shares are included, whether nonprobate
assets are included, and whether deductions and credits are to be used
in the computations are open questions after Bovaird. Since it is un-
clear which of the two alternative theories of the case will serve as the
basis for future holdings in this area, it is difficult to predict how
Oklahoma courts will treat these cases.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court could have avoided these problems
by either specifying which property interests are subject to the holding
or by simply affirming the trial court's ruling that the forced share of a
116. Id § 5(a) at 163.
117. I.R.C. § 2013 (1976). A credit is allowed against the federal estate tax for a portion of
estate taxes paid in a previous estate on property later included in the taxable estate of a second
estate. The credit is 100% of taxes paid from the first estate if the second death occurs within two
years; thereafter, it declines to 20% at ten years and afterwards is withdrawn. The purpose of the
credit is to avoid a heavy tax load when decedents die in close succession, the first transferring the
property to the second and each being forced to pay estate tax. See generally 2 FED. EST. & GiT
TAX REP. (CCH) 16150 (1977); 3 EST. PLANNING & TAX'N COORDINATOR (RIA) 1 45,251 (1982)
(explanation of the credit).
118. UNIF. ET. TAX APPORTIONMENT AcT § 5(a), 8 U.L.A. 163 (1972).
119. I.R.C. § 2051 (1976) defines the taxable estate as the gross estate less allowable deduc-
tions. Section 2001 applies the tax to the taxable estate. Sections 2010-2015 provide for various
credits against the tax.
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surviving spouse is not residue. Since the court did neither, the prudent
personal representative and his attorney will follow the narrowest pos-
sible holding and do as Mrs. Bovaird did: seek the guidance of the
probate court under the Declaratory Judgment Act.120 It seems un-
likely that equitable apportionment in Oklahoma will be limited to the
forced share of a surviving spouse; the result is simply too unfair to too
many spouses. Furthermore, because both Bovaird and Davidson'2'
were unanimous decisions, there appears to be strong support for equi-
table apportionment on the Oklahoma Supreme Court. But only fu-
ture cases can clarify the extent to which the court will move towards
complete equitable apportionment.
.H Coiner, Jr.
120. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1651-1657 (1981).
121. 641 P.2d I110 (Okla. 1982).
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